Directors' Duties: Financial Crisis And The Obligation To Consider The Interests of Creditors

By Victor Yeo Chuan Seng

Introduction

We are all familiar with the principle that directors have a general duty to act in the best interests of the company. In most situations where this is an issue, the company is usually treated as being synonymous with its shareholders as a whole because, according to the economic theory of the firm, shareholders are the residual claimants of the assets of the company. However, when the company is in the red and particularly where there is little or no likelihood that the company can trade out of its financial distress, this concept of acting for the benefit of shareholders takes on a different complexion. Under such circumstances, the creditor’s interests become paramount as they should be regarded as the ‘de facto’ residual claimants of the company’ s assets where the company is insolvent.

However, when a company is insolvent, shareholders have less of an incentive to exercise control over the directors’ decisions that may benefit the company as an entity in itself as any improvement in the company’s financial position would generally be for the benefit of creditors. In fact, the shareholders are actually incentivised to encourage the directors to take risks in the hope that the company will be able to trade out of its financial distress. There is also the possibility that directors may see no gain in trying to preserve the company for the creditors and may instead find acting to their detriment in favour of shareholders an irresistibly attractive option. This is particularly so in the case of closely-held companies where the interests of directors and shareholders are closely aligned. This places the interests of the company’s creditors at risk as they are neither able to directly control the actions of the company’s directors nor are they able to gain access to the necessary information about the financial position of the company for them to recover their debt prior to the assets of the company being dissipated.

Company law recognises this predicament faced by creditors and places on company directors the obligation to consider the interest of the creditors where the company is insolvent or is facing insolvency. In some circumstances, the law goes so far as to ignore the principle that the company is a separate legal entity from its controllers and to hold directors personally liable for debts that the company may owe to creditors. Additionally, action that may prejudice the interests of the company’s creditors may also expose directors to criminal prosecution. In this article, we summarise key areas which directors of companies whose solvency is in issue should pay close attention to.

1. Defrauding creditors

The most obvious scenario where directors may be held personally liable to creditors is where they have used the company to perpetrate a fraud against the creditors. Case law has made it clear that where a company is used as a vehicle of fraud, the courts will not hesitate to disregard the separate entity doctrine and hold the corporate controllers liable for the fraud. Similarly, section 340(1) of the Companies Act provides that:

“(i)f, in the course of the winding up of a company or in any proceedings against a company, it appears that any business of the company has been carried on with the intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors or any other person or for a fraudulent purpose, the Court, on the application of the liquidator or any creditor or contributory of the company, may, if it thinks proper to do so, declare that any person who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in that manner shall be personally responsible, without any limitation of liability, for all or any of the debts or other liabilities of the company as the Court directs.”

Such activity is often referred to as ‘fraudulent trading’. While insolvency is not a requisite for establishing fraudulent trading, situations where directors have been found liable for fraudulent trading often relate to insolvent companies. Examples include situations where directors have knowingly manipulated accounts or made misrepresentations as to the financial viability of the company so as to secure contracts or funding with the intent to defraud creditors. In addition to being made personally responsible for the debts of the company, directors found liable for fraudulent trading may be prosecuted for an offence.

2. Breach of directors duties affecting creditors

Generally, where directors, in breach of their duties, cause loss to the company, the company’s shareholders may ratify these breaches of duties at general meetings and choose not to hold directors accountable. The premise for allowing this is that shareholders being the owners of the residual assets of the company are at liberty to excuse directors their indiscretions. As alluded to earlier, this premise may not be totally applicable where the company is insolvent or becomes insolvent as a result of the directors’ breach of their duties as the focus under these circumstances shifts from the interests of shareholders to those of the creditors. Directors may therefore still be held liable for breach of their duties to the company if they act in a manner which may prejudice the interests of creditors even if the shareholders of the company have no objections to their actions or where they may actually have benefited.

In Chip Thye Enterprises Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Phay Gi Mo and Others for example, directors of the company (who were also its shareholders) who arranged to, amongst other things, write-off sums owed by one of their number as well as sums owed by parties related to them; make certain payments made to two of their number and invested certain sums into a foreign partnership which came to naught within a month, were held liable to compensate the company for all these sums. The court held that the transactions were clearly not in the interests of the creditors as they all reduced the assets of the company, which should have been preserved and made available for the discharge of the company’s liabilities to its creditors at the relevant time since the company was then insolvent. It is perhaps pertinent to point out that there was no allegation in the case that the directors were intentionally acting in the manner so as to defraud the company’s creditors.

It is obvious that directors should always do their utmost to ensure that they do not breach the duties which they owe to their companies. The point being made here, however, is that acting in the interests of the company does not necessarily translate into looking after the interests of the company’s shareholders per se. Directors (particularly those of closely held companies and nominee directors of wholly-owned subsidiaries where such situations are more likely to arise) should not be under the misapprehension that so long as they look after the welfare of shareholders and / or act with the shareholders consent and approval that they will not be held liable for breach of their duties. They should pay close attention to how their actions may impact other stakeholders, and where the company is not in a strong financial position, pay particular attention to the interests of creditors. 

Failing to do so may expose them to a liquidator’s claim on behalf of the company should the company go into insolvent liquidation.

3. Liability for wrongful trading

Wrongful trading is the phrase used to describe situations where directors (and other officers) of a company knowingly or recklessly cause the company to incur debts when there is no reasonable or probable ground of expectation, after taking into consideration the other liabilities, if any, of the company being able to pay the debt. It is governed by section 339(3) of the Companies Act read together with section 340(2).

In Singapore, wrongful trading is an offence and it is only upon conviction of the offence that an errant director or officer may be ordered to compensate creditors who have suffered a loss as a result of being unable to recover the debt in question. It may be seen as an extension of the duty to consider the interests of creditors discussed in the earlier section except that creditors here have the right to apply directly for an order for compensation and need not rely solely on the liquidator to sue the directors on their behalf. Moreover, it is not necessary that the company be under insolvent liquidation for action to be proceeded with for wrongful trading. Prosecution for wrongful trading may be initiated where it appears, in any proceedings against the company, that an officer has engaged in such activity.

Directors should note, however, that there are corresponding laws in other jurisdictions where a conviction for wrongful trading is not a prerequisite to a civil claim. For example Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom all have legislation that basically allows creditors and other affected stakeholders to take action against directors personally for incurring debts under circumstances where there is no expectation of the debt being repaid or for engaging in conduct that causes substantial risk of serious loss to the company’s creditors.

Wrongful trading laws pose a dilemma to directors who are already facing the stress of dealing with cash-flow concerns and the likelihood of insolvency. On the one hand, it is accepted that risk-taking is an essential component of success in business. On the other hand, insolvent trading laws may potentially discourage directors from embarking on risky activity, which may possibly lead to the company’s recovery instead of its demise. Be that as it may, directors should strive to achieve a balanced risk-taking approach and consciously make an effort to pay close attention to the survivability of the company, particularly when taking on additional debt or engaging in other conduct that may result in substantial serious risk of loss for the company’s creditors. They should steer away from such conduct where they have formed an opinion that insolvent liquidation is imminent or unavoidable.

4. Payment of dividends

Directors should also be very familiar with the rule that dividends may only be paid out of profits. Under section 403 of the Companies Act, every director or manager of a company who wilfully pays or permits to be paid any dividend in contravention of the rule is liable for an offence and may also be made personally liable to the creditors of the company for the amount of the debts due by the company to them respectively to the extent by which the dividends so paid have exceeded the profits.

There is still some uncertainty surrounding the precise legal definition of “profits” for the purpose of this rule. This is notwithstanding that the Company Legislation and Regulatory Framework Committee had recommended that dividend distributions should only be permitted where the company has accumulated realised gains in accordance with prescribed accounting standards. Whatever the case, it is extremely unlikely for a court to be persuaded that an insolvent company would have distributable profits. On the contrary, the court in Chip Thye Enterprises Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Phay Gi Mo and Others held that directors who allow the payment of dividends where there is no available profits are in breach of both their fiduciary duties to the company and section 403 of the Companies Act, neither of which are dependent on the solvency of the company. It is thus pertinent for directors to obtain proper confirmation from their auditors that the company does have distributable profits prior to paying out any dividends. Clearly, a conservative approach towards the definition of “profits” for this purpose would be prudent.

5. Share buy-backs

Another area where the company’s solvency becomes an important issue for consideration is where the board is considering engaging in share buy-backs or repurchases of the company’s own shares. A repurchase of a company’s ordinary shares may be effected in accordance with the procedures provided for under sections 76B to K of the Companies Act. The repurchase may be funded out of distributable profits or out of the company’s capital. The relevant caveat in the context of this article is that payments may only be made under a share buy-back scheme only where the company is solvent. Contravention of this would not only make the repurchase unlawful, but every director or manager who approved or authorised the purchase, knowing that the company was not solvent at the relevant time will be guilty of an offence.

For this purpose, a company is regarded as being solvent only if:

(a) the company is able to pay its debts in full at the time of the payment and will be able to pay its debts as they fall due in the normal course of business during the period of 12 months immediately following the date of the payment; and

(b) the value of the company’s assets is not less than the value of its liabilities (including contingent liabilities) and will not after the proposed purchase become less than the value of its liabilities (including contingent liabilities). Directors should monitor the company’s financial status at the time that the payments are made in respect of the share repurchase as this is the relevant time for determining the solvency of the company and not only at the time when approval is sought from the general meeting for the repurchase scheme. Members resolutions and contracts that involve share repurchases should also have language indicating that payments in respect of such transactions are contingent on the company being solvent as defined under section 76F of the Act.

6. Making of solvency statements

Directors of companies that are facing cash flow concerns will also need to pay close attention to their company’s solvency status when undertaking exercises which require the making of a solvency statement. Under the Companies Act solvency statements may be required where the company wishes to conduct any of the following:

• redemption of redeemable preference shares out of capital under section 70;

• reduction of share capital under sections 78B or 78C; or

• provision of financial assistance by a company for the acquisition of its own shares under sections 76(9A) or (9B).

A solvency statement for this purpose is a statement by the company’s directors —

(a) that they have formed the opinion that, as regards the company’s situation at the date of the statement, there is no ground on which the company could then be found to be unable to pay its debts;

(b) that they have formed the opinion —

(i) if it is intended to commence winding up of the company within the period of 12 months immediately following the date of the statement, that the company will be able to pay its debts in full within the period of 12 months beginning with the commencement of the winding up; or

(ii) if it is not intended so to commence winding up, that the company will be able to pay its debts as they fall due during the period of 12 months immediately following the date of the statement; and

(c) that they have formed the opinion that the value of the company’s assets is not less than the value of its liabilities (including contingent liabilities) and will not, after the proposed redemption, giving of financial assistance or reduction (as the case may be), become less than the value of its liabilities (including contingent liabilities). Directors of companies that wish to undertake amalgamations pursuant to sections 215A – G are also required to furnish similar solvency statements in respect of the amalgamating or amalgamated companies involved in the amalgamation exercise. Where the company is exempt from audit requirements or where a “short-form” amalgamation is undertaken under section 251J, the solvency statement is to be in the form of a statutory declaration. Otherwise, the statement may, instead of taking the form of a statutory declaration, be accompanied by a report from the company’s auditor that he has inquired into the affairs of the company and is of the opinion that the statement is not unreasonable given all the circumstances. It is an offence for a director to make a solvency statement without having reasonable grounds for the opinions expressed in it. This may also amount to a breach of directors’ duties and expose directors to civil suits should the company go into insolvent liquidation. Directors should therefore obtain the advice from their company’s auditors for assurance that it is reasonable to give the solvency statement under the circumstances. This is more so where the company is facing cash flow issues and there is some doubt about the company’s solvency.

Conclusion

Financial difficulty brings much stress and concern for corporate directors and managers. They have to deal with cash flow issues, survivability concerns and how best to bring the company back to profitability. This article has summarised additional matters that directors may need to pay close attention to where the company’s solvency is in doubt. The laws governing these matters are primarily targeted at protecting the interests of creditors. It is important, in a time such as this where many companies may face cash-flow and credit issues as well as other challenges in maintaining their solvency, that directors familiarise themselves with these legal rules as failing to do so may expose directors to civil or criminal proceedings.